docs: enhance documentation with threat model, limitations, air-gapped guidance

- Update version to v1.4.4
- Add explicit threat model documentation
- Document known limitations prominently
- Include air-gapped usage recommendations
- Polish all documentation for clarity and examples
- Update README, DEVELOPMENT.md, GEMINI.md, RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md
This commit is contained in:
LC mac
2026-02-03 02:24:59 +08:00
parent a7ab757669
commit 4353ec0cc2
10 changed files with 1208 additions and 333 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Here's your `DEVELOPMENT.md`: Here's your `DEVELOPMENT.md`:
```markdown ```markdown
# Development Guide - SeedPGP v1.1.0 # Development Guide - SeedPGP v1.4.4
## Architecture Quick Reference ## Architecture Quick Reference

View File

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
## Project Overview ## Project Overview
**SeedPGP v1.4.3**: Client-side BIP39 mnemonic encryption webapp **SeedPGP v1.4.4**: Client-side BIP39 mnemonic encryption webapp
**Stack**: Bun + Vite + React + TypeScript + OpenPGP.js + Tailwind CSS **Stack**: Bun + Vite + React + TypeScript + OpenPGP.js + Tailwind CSS
**Deploy**: GitHub Pages (public repo: `seedpgp-web-app`, private source: `seedpgp-web`) **Deploy**: Cloudflare Pages (private repo: `seedpgp-web`)
**Live URL**: <https://kccleoc.github.io/seedpgp-web-app/> **Live URL**: <https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev/>
## Core Constraints ## Core Constraints
@@ -314,9 +314,26 @@ await window.runSessionCryptoTest()
--- ---
## Current Version: v1.4.3 ## Current Version: v1.4.4
*Please update the "Recent Changes", "Known Limitations", and "Next Priorities" sections to reflect the current state of the project.* **Recent Changes (v1.4.4):**
- Enhanced security documentation with explicit threat model
- Improved README with simple examples and best practices
- Better air-gapped usage guidance for maximum security
- Version bump with security audit improvements
**Known Limitations (Critical):**
1. **Browser extensions** can read DOM, memory, keystrokes - use dedicated browser
2. **Memory persistence** - JavaScript cannot force immediate memory wiping
3. **XSS attacks** if hosting server is compromised - host locally
4. **Hardware keyloggers** - physical device compromise not protected against
5. **Supply chain attacks** - compromised dependencies possible
6. **Quantum computers** - future threat to current cryptography
**Next Priorities:**
1. Enhanced BIP39 validation (full wordlist + checksum)
2. Multi-frame support for larger payloads
3. Hardware wallet integration (Trezor/Keystone)
--- ---

655
README.md
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# SeedPGP v1.4.3 # SeedPGP v1.4.4
**Secure BIP39 mnemonic backup using PGP encryption and QR codes** **Secure BIP39 mnemonic backup using PGP encryption and QR codes**
@@ -6,27 +6,199 @@ A client-side web app for encrypting cryptocurrency seed phrases with OpenPGP an
**Live App:** <https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev> **Live App:** <https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev>
## Features ---
- 🔐 **PGP Encryption**: Uses cv25519 (Curve25519) for modern elliptic curve cryptography ## ✨ Quick Start
- 📱 **QR Code Ready**: Base45 encoding optimized for QR code generation
-**Integrity Checking**: CRC16-CCITT-FALSE checksums prevent corruption
- 🔑 **BIP39 Support**: Full support for 12/18/24-word mnemonics with passphrase indicator
- 🧪 **Battle-Tested**: Validated against official Trezor BIP39 test vectors
-**Fast**: Built with Bun runtime and Vite for optimal performance
- 🔒 **Session-Key Encryption**: Ephemeral AES-GCM-256 encryption for in-memory protection
- 🛡️ **CSP Enforcement**: Real Content Security Policy headers block all network requests
- 📸 **QR Scanner**: Camera and file upload support for scanning encrypted QR codes
- 👁️ **Security Monitoring**: Real-time storage monitoring and clipboard tracking
## Installation ### 🔒 Backup Your Seed (in 30 seconds)
1. **Run locally** (recommended for maximum security):
```bash ```bash
# Clone repository
git clone https://github.com/kccleoc/seedpgp-web.git git clone https://github.com/kccleoc/seedpgp-web.git
cd seedpgp-web cd seedpgp-web
bun install
bun run dev
# Open http://localhost:5173
```
# Install dependencies 2. **Enter your 12/24-word BIP39 mnemonic**
3. **Choose encryption method**:
- **Option A**: Upload your PGP public key (`.asc` file or paste)
- **Option B**: Set a strong password (AES-256 encryption)
4. **Click "Generate QR Backup"** → Save/print the QR code
### 🔓 Restore Your Seed
1. **Scan the QR code** (camera or upload image)
2. **Provide decryption key**:
- PGP private key + passphrase (if using PGP)
- Password (if using password encryption)
3. **Mnemonic appears for 10 seconds** → auto-clears for security
---
## 🛡️ Explicit Threat Model Documentation
### 🎯 What SeedPGP Protects Against (Security Guarantees)
SeedPGP is designed to protect against specific threats when used correctly:
| Threat | Protection | Implementation Details |
|--------|------------|------------------------|
| **Accidental browser storage** | Real-time monitoring & alerts for localStorage/sessionStorage | StorageDetails component shows all browser storage activity |
| **Clipboard exposure** | Clipboard tracking with warnings and history clearing | ClipboardDetails tracks all copy operations, shows what/when |
| **Network leaks** | Strict CSP headers blocking ALL external requests | Cloudflare Pages enforces CSP: `default-src 'self'; connect-src 'none'` |
| **Wrong-key usage** | Key fingerprint validation prevents wrong-key decryption | OpenPGP.js validates recipient fingerprints before decryption |
| **QR corruption** | CRC16-CCITT-FALSE checksum detects scanning/printing errors | Frame format includes 4-digit hex CRC for integrity verification |
| **Memory persistence** | Session-key encryption with auto-clear timers | AES-GCM-256 session keys, 10-second auto-clear for restored mnemonics |
| **Shoulder surfing** | Read-only mode blurs sensitive data, disables inputs | Toggle blurs content, disables form inputs, prevents clipboard operations |
### ⚠️ **Critical Limitations & What SeedPGP CANNOT Protect Against**
**IMPORTANT: Understand these limitations before trusting SeedPGP with significant funds:**
| Threat | Reason | Recommended Mitigation |
|--------|--------|-----------------------|
| **Browser extensions** | Malicious extensions can read DOM, memory, keystrokes | Use dedicated browser with all extensions disabled; consider browser isolation |
| **Memory analysis** | JavaScript cannot force immediate memory wiping; strings may persist in RAM | Use airgapped device, reboot after use, consider hardware wallets |
| **XSS attacks** | If hosting server is compromised, malicious JS could be injected | Host locally from verified source, use Subresource Integrity (SRI) checks |
| **Hardware keyloggers** | Physical device compromise at hardware/firmware level | Use trusted hardware, consider hardware wallets for large amounts |
| **Supply chain attacks** | Compromised dependencies (OpenPGP.js, React, etc.) | Audit dependencies regularly, verify checksums, consider reproducible builds |
| **Quantum computers** | Future threat to current elliptic curve cryptography | Store encrypted backups physically, rotate periodically, monitor crypto developments |
| **Browser bugs/exploits** | Zero-day vulnerabilities in browser rendering engine | Keep browsers updated, use security-focused browsers (Brave, Tor) |
| **Screen recording** | Malware or built-in OS screen recording | Use privacy screens, be aware of surroundings during sensitive operations |
| **Timing attacks** | Potential side-channel attacks on JavaScript execution | Use constant-time algorithms where possible, though limited in browser context |
### 🔬 Technical Security Architecture
**Encryption Stack:**
- **PGP Encryption:** OpenPGP.js with AES-256 (OpenPGP standard)
- **Session Keys:** Web Crypto API AES-GCM-256 with `extractable: false`
- **Key Derivation:** PBKDF2 for password-based keys (when used)
- **Integrity:** CRC16-CCITT-FALSE checksums on all frames
- **Encoding:** Base45 (RFC 9285) for QR-friendly representation
**Memory Management Limitations:**
- JavaScript strings are immutable and may persist in memory after "clearing"
- Garbage collection timing is non-deterministic and implementation-dependent
- Browser crash dumps may contain sensitive data in memory
- The best practice is to minimize exposure time and use airgapped devices
### 🏆 Best Practices for Maximum Security
1. **Airgapped Workflow** (Recommended for large amounts):
```
[Online Device] → Generate PGP keypair → Export public key
[Airgapped Device] → Run SeedPGP locally → Encrypt with public key
[Airgapped Device] → Print QR code → Store physically
[Online Device] → Never touches private key or plaintext seed
```
2. **Local Execution** (Next best):
```bash
# Clone and run offline
git clone https://github.com/kccleoc/seedpgp-web.git
cd seedpgp-web
bun install
# Disable network, then run
bun run dev -- --host 127.0.0.1
```
3. **Cloudflare Pages** (Convenient but trust required):
- ✅ Real CSP enforcement (blocks network at browser level)
- ✅ Security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
- ⚠️ Trusts Cloudflare infrastructure
- ⚠️ Requires HTTPS connection
---
## 📚 Simple Usage Examples
### Example 1: Password-only Encryption (Simplest)
```typescript
import { encryptToSeed, decryptFromSeed } from "./lib/seedpgp";
// Backup with password
const mnemonic = "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about";
const result = await encryptToSeed({
plaintext: mnemonic,
messagePassword: "MyStrongPassword123!",
});
console.log(result.framed); // "SEEDPGP1:0:ABCD:BASE45DATA..."
// Restore with password
const restored = await decryptFromSeed({
frameText: result.framed,
messagePassword: "MyStrongPassword123!",
});
console.log(restored.w); // Original mnemonic
```
### Example 2: PGP Key Encryption (More Secure)
```typescript
import { encryptToSeed, decryptFromSeed } from "./lib/seedpgp";
const publicKey = `-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
... your public key here ...
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----`;
const privateKey = `-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
... your private key here ...
-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----`;
// Backup with PGP key
const result = await encryptToSeed({
plaintext: mnemonic,
publicKeyArmored: publicKey,
});
// Restore with PGP key
const restored = await decryptFromSeed({
frameText: result.framed,
privateKeyArmored: privateKey,
privateKeyPassphrase: "your-key-password",
});
```
### Example 3: Krux-Compatible Encryption (Hardware Wallet Users)
```typescript
import { encryptToSeed, decryptFromSeed } from "./lib/seedpgp";
// Krux mode uses passphrase-only encryption
const result = await encryptToSeed({
plaintext: mnemonic,
messagePassword: "MyStrongPassphrase",
mode: 'krux',
kruxLabel: 'Main Wallet Backup',
kruxIterations: 200000,
});
// Hex format compatible with Krux firmware
console.log(result.framed); // Hex string starting with KEF:
```
---
## 🔧 Installation & Development
### Prerequisites
- [Bun](https://bun.sh) v1.3.6+ (recommended) or Node.js 18+
- Git
### Quick Install
```bash
# Clone and install
git clone https://github.com/kccleoc/seedpgp-web.git
cd seedpgp-web
bun install bun install
# Run tests # Run tests
@@ -34,354 +206,253 @@ bun test
# Start development server # Start development server
bun run dev bun run dev
```
## Usage
### Web Interface
Visit <https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev> or run locally:
```bash
bun run dev
# Open http://localhost:5173 # Open http://localhost:5173
``` ```
**Backup Flow:** ### Production Build
1. Enter your BIP39 mnemonic (12/18/24 words)
2. Import PGP public key or set encryption password
3. Click "Backup" to encrypt and generate QR code
4. Save/print QR code for offline storage
**Restore Flow (Web Interface):**
1. Scan QR code or paste encrypted text
2. Import PGP private key or enter password
3. Click "Restore" to decrypt mnemonic
4. Mnemonic auto-clears after 10 seconds
**Offline/Manual Restore:**
For airgapped recovery without the web interface, use the command-line method documented in [RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md](RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md):
1. Extract Base45 payload from SEEDPGP1 frame
2. Decode Base45 to PGP binary
3. Decrypt with GPG using private key or password
4. Parse JSON output to recover mnemonic
See [RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md](RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md) for complete step-by-step instructions.
### API Usage
```typescript
import { encryptToSeedPgp, buildPlaintext } from "./lib/seedpgp";
const mnemonic = "legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow";
const plaintext = buildPlaintext(mnemonic, false); // false = no BIP39 passphrase used
const result = await encryptToSeedPgp({
plaintext,
publicKeyArmored: yourPgpPublicKey,
});
console.log(result.framed); // SEEDPGP1:0:ABCD:BASE45DATA...
console.log(result.recipientFingerprint); // Key fingerprint for verification
```
### Decrypt a SeedPGP Frame
```typescript
import { decryptSeedPgp } from "./lib/seedpgp";
const decrypted = await decryptSeedPgp({
frameText: "SEEDPGP1:0:ABCD:BASE45DATA...",
privateKeyArmored: yourPrivateKey,
privateKeyPassphrase: "your-key-password",
});
console.log(decrypted.w); // Recovered mnemonic
console.log(decrypted.pp); // BIP39 passphrase indicator (0 or 1)
```
## Deployment
**Production:** Cloudflare Pages (auto-deploys from `main` branch)
**Live URL:** <https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev>
### Cloudflare Pages Setup
This project is deployed on Cloudflare Pages for enhanced security features:
1. **Repository:** `seedpgp-web` (private repo)
2. **Build command:** `bun run build`
3. **Output directory:** `dist/`
4. **Security headers:** Automatically enforced via `public/_headers`
### Benefits Over GitHub Pages
- ✅ Real CSP header enforcement (blocks network requests at browser level)
- ✅ Custom security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
- ✅ Auto-deploy on push to main
- ✅ Build preview for PRs
- ✅ Better performance (global CDN)
- ✅ Cost: $0/month
### Deployment Workflow
```bash ```bash
# Commit feature bun run build # Build to dist/
git add src/ bun run preview # Preview production build
git commit -m "feat(v1.x): description"
# Tag version (triggers auto-deploy to Cloudflare)
git tag v1.x.x
git push origin main --tags
``` ```
**No manual deployment needed!** Cloudflare Pages auto-deploys when you push to `main`. ---
## Frame Format ## 🔐 Advanced Security Features
``` ### Session-Key Encryption
SEEDPGP1:FRAME:CRC16:BASE45DATA - **AES-GCM-256** ephemeral keys for in-memory protection
- Auto-destroys on tab close/navigation
- Manual lock/clear button for immediate wiping
SEEDPGP1 - Protocol identifier and version ### Storage Monitoring
0 - Frame number (0 = single frame) - Real-time tracking of localStorage/sessionStorage
ABCD - 4-digit hex CRC16-CCITT-FALSE checksum - Alerts for sensitive data detection
BASE45 - Base45-encoded PGP message - Visual indicators of storage usage
```
## API Reference ### Clipboard Protection
- Tracks all copy operations
- Shows what was copied and when
- One-click history clearing
### `buildPlaintext(mnemonic, bip39PassphraseUsed, recipientFingerprints?)` ### Read-Only Mode
- Blurs all sensitive data
- Disables all inputs
- Prevents clipboard operations
- Perfect for demonstrations or shared screens
Creates a SeedPGP plaintext object. ---
**Parameters:** ## 📖 API Reference
- `mnemonic` (string): BIP39 mnemonic phrase (12/18/24 words) ### Core Functions
- `bip39PassphraseUsed` (boolean): Whether a BIP39 passphrase was used
- `recipientFingerprints` (string[]): Optional array of recipient key fingerprints
**Returns:** `SeedPgpPlaintext` object #### `encryptToSeed(params)`
Encrypts a mnemonic to SeedPGP format.
### `encryptToSeedPgp(params)`
Encrypts a plaintext object to SeedPGP format.
**Parameters:**
```typescript ```typescript
{ interface EncryptionParams {
plaintext: SeedPgpPlaintext; plaintext: string | SeedPgpPlaintext; // Mnemonic or plaintext object
publicKeyArmored?: string; // PGP public key (PKESK) publicKeyArmored?: string; // PGP public key (optional)
messagePassword?: string; // Symmetric password (SKESK) messagePassword?: string; // Password (optional)
mode?: 'pgp' | 'krux'; // Encryption mode
kruxLabel?: string; // Label for Krux mode
kruxIterations?: number; // PBKDF2 iterations for Krux
} }
const result = await encryptToSeed({
plaintext: "your mnemonic here",
messagePassword: "optional-password",
});
// Returns: { framed: string, pgpBytes?: Uint8Array, recipientFingerprint?: string }
``` ```
**Returns:** #### `decryptFromSeed(params)`
```typescript
{
framed: string; // SEEDPGP1 frame
pgpBytes: Uint8Array; // Raw PGP message
recipientFingerprint?: string; // Key fingerprint
}
```
### `decryptSeedPgp(params)`
Decrypts a SeedPGP frame. Decrypts a SeedPGP frame.
**Parameters:**
```typescript ```typescript
{ interface DecryptionParams {
frameText: string; // SEEDPGP1 frame frameText: string; // SEEDPGP1 frame or KEF hex
privateKeyArmored?: string; // PGP private key privateKeyArmored?: string; // PGP private key (optional)
privateKeyPassphrase?: string; // Key unlock password privateKeyPassphrase?: string; // Key password (optional)
messagePassword?: string; // SKESK password messagePassword?: string; // Message password (optional)
mode?: 'pgp' | 'krux'; // Encryption mode
} }
const plaintext = await decryptFromSeed({
frameText: "SEEDPGP1:0:ABCD:...",
messagePassword: "your-password",
});
// Returns: SeedPgpPlaintext { v: 1, t: "bip39", w: string, l: "en", pp: number }
``` ```
**Returns:** `SeedPgpPlaintext` object ### Frame Format
```
SEEDPGP1:FRAME:CRC16:BASE45DATA
└────────┬────────┘ └──┬──┘ └─────┬─────┘
Protocol & Frame CRC16 Base45-encoded
Version Number Check PGP Message
## Testing Examples:
• SEEDPGP1:0:ABCD:J9ESODB... # Single frame
• KEF:0123456789ABCDEF... # Krux Encryption Format (hex)
```
---
## 🚀 Deployment Options
### Option 1: Localhost (Most Secure)
```bash
# Run on airgapped machine
bun run dev -- --host 127.0.0.1
# Browser only connects to localhost, no external traffic
```
### Option 2: Self-Hosted (Balanced)
- Build: `bun run build`
- Serve `dist/` via NGINX/Apache with HTTPS
- Set CSP headers (see `public/_headers`)
### Option 3: Cloudflare Pages (Convenient)
- Auto-deploys from GitHub
- Built-in CDN and security headers
- [seedpgp-web.pages.dev](https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev)
---
## 🧪 Testing & Verification
### Test Suite
```bash ```bash
# Run all tests # Run all tests
bun test bun test
# Run with verbose output # Run specific test categories
bun test --verbose bun test --test-name-pattern="Trezor" # BIP39 test vectors
bun test --test-name-pattern="CRC" # Integrity checks
bun test --test-name-pattern="Krux" # Krux compatibility
# Watch mode (auto-rerun on changes) # Watch mode (development)
bun test --watch bun test --watch
``` ```
### Test Coverage ### Test Coverage
- ✅ **15 comprehensive tests** including edge cases
- ✅ **8 official Trezor BIP39 test vectors**
- ✅ **CRC16 integrity validation** (corruption detection)
- ✅ **Wrong key/password** rejection testing
- ✅ **Frame format parsing** (malformed input handling)
- ✅ 15 comprehensive tests ---
- ✅ 8 official Trezor BIP39 test vectors
- ✅ Edge cases (wrong key, wrong passphrase)
- ✅ Frame format validation
- ✅ CRC16 integrity checking
## Security Considerations ## 📁 Project Structure
### ✅ Best Practices
- Uses **AES-256** for symmetric encryption
- **cv25519** provides ~128-bit security level
- **CRC16** detects QR scan errors (not cryptographic)
- Key fingerprint validation prevents wrong-key usage
- **Session-key encryption**: Ephemeral AES-GCM-256 for in-memory protection
- **CSP headers**: Browser-enforced network blocking via Cloudflare Pages
### ⚠️ Important Notes
- **Never share your private key or encrypted QR codes publicly**
- Store backup QR codes in secure physical locations (safe, safety deposit box)
- Use a strong PGP key passphrase (20+ characters)
- Test decryption immediately after generating backups
- Consider password-only (SKESK) encryption as additional fallback
### 🔒 Production Deployment Warning
The Cloudflare Pages deployment at **<https://seedpgp-web.pages.dev>** is for:
- ✅ Personal use with enhanced security
- ✅ CSP enforcement blocks all network requests
- ✅ Convenient access from any device
- ⚠️ Always verify the URL before use
For maximum security with real funds:
- Run locally: `bun run dev`
- Or self-host on your own domain with HTTPS
- Use an airgapped device for critical operations
### Threat Model (Honest)
**What we protect against:**
- Accidental persistence to localStorage/sessionStorage
- Plaintext secrets lingering in React state after use
- Clipboard history exposure (with warnings)
**What we DON'T protect against:**
- Active XSS or malicious browser extensions
- Memory dumps or browser crash reports
- JavaScript garbage collection timing (non-deterministic)
## Project Structure
``` ```
seedpgp-web/ seedpgp-web/
├── src/ ├── src/
│ ├── components/ │ ├── components/ # React UI components
│ │ ├── PgpKeyInput.tsx # PGP key import UI │ │ ├── PgpKeyInput.tsx # PGP key import (drag & drop)
│ │ ├── QrDisplay.tsx # QR code generation │ │ ├── QrDisplay.tsx # QR code generation
│ │ ├── QrScanner.tsx # Camera + file scanner │ │ ├── QRScanner.tsx # Camera + file scanning
│ │ ├── ReadOnly.tsx # Read-only mode toggle │ │ ├── SecurityWarnings.tsx # Threat model display
│ │ ├── StorageIndicator.tsx # Storage monitoring │ │ ├── StorageDetails.tsx # Storage monitoring
│ │ ── SecurityWarnings.tsx # Context alerts │ │ ── ClipboardDetails.tsx # Clipboard tracking
│ │ └── ClipboardTracker.tsx # Clipboard monitoring
│ ├── lib/ │ ├── lib/
│ │ ├── seedpgp.ts # Core encryption/decryption │ │ ├── seedpgp.ts # Core encryption/decryption
│ │ ├── seedpgp.test.ts # Test vectors │ │ ├── sessionCrypto.ts # AES-GCM session key management
│ │ ├── sessionCrypto.ts # Ephemeral session keys │ │ ├── krux.ts # Krux KEF compatibility
│ │ ├── base45.ts # Base45 codec │ │ ├── bip39.ts # BIP39 validation
│ │ ├── crc16.ts # CRC16-CCITT-FALSE │ │ ├── base45.ts # Base45 encoding/decoding
│ │ ── qr.ts # QR utilities │ │ ── crc16.ts # CRC16-CCITT-FALSE checksums
│ │ └── types.ts # TypeScript definitions
│ ├── App.tsx # Main application │ ├── App.tsx # Main application
│ └── main.tsx # React entry point │ └── main.tsx # React entry point
├── public/ ├── public/
│ └── _headers # Cloudflare CSP headers │ └── _headers # Cloudflare security headers
├── package.json ├── package.json
├── vite.config.ts # Vite configuration ├── vite.config.ts
├── GEMINI.md # AI agent project brief
├── RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md # Offline recovery guide ├── RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md # Offline recovery guide
└── README.md # This file └── README.md # This file
``` ```
## Tech Stack ---
- **Runtime**: [Bun](https://bun.sh) v1.3.6+ ## 🔄 Version History
- **Language**: TypeScript (strict mode)
- **Crypto**: [OpenPGP.js](https://openpgpjs.org) v6.3.0
- **Framework**: React + Vite
- **UI**: Tailwind CSS
- **Icons**: lucide-react
- **QR**: html5-qrcode, qrcode
- **Testing**: Bun test runner
- **Deployment**: Cloudflare Pages
## Version History ### v1.4.4 (2026-02-03)
-**Enhanced security documentation** with explicit threat model
-**Improved README** with simple examples and best practices
-**Better air-gapped usage guidance** for maximum security
-**Version bump** with security audit improvements
### v1.4.3 (2026-01-30) ### v1.4.3 (2026-01-30)
- ✅ Fixed textarea contrast for readability - ✅ Fixed textarea contrast for readability
- ✅ Fixed overlapping floating boxes - ✅ Fixed overlapping floating boxes
- ✅ Polished UI with modern crypto wallet design - ✅ Polished UI with modern crypto wallet design
- ✅ Updated background color to be lighter
### v1.4.2 (2026-01-30) ### v1.4.2 (2026-01-30)
- ✅ Migrated to Cloudflare Pages for real CSP enforcement - ✅ Migrated to Cloudflare Pages for real CSP enforcement
- ✅ Added "Encrypted in memory" badge when mnemonic locked - ✅ Added "Encrypted in memory" badge
- ✅ Improved security header configuration - ✅ Improved security header configuration
- ✅ Updated deployment documentation
### v1.4.0 (2026-01-29) ### v1.4.0 (2026-01-29)
- ✅ Extended session-key encryption to Restore flow - ✅ Extended session-key encryption to Restore flow
- ✅ Added 10-second auto-clear timer for restored mnemonic - ✅ Added 10-second auto-clear timer for restored mnemonic
- ✅ Added manual Hide button for immediate clearing - ✅ Added manual Hide button for immediate clearing
- ✅ Removed debug console logs from production
### v1.3.0 (2026-01-28) [View full version history...](https://github.com/kccleoc/seedpgp-web/releases)
- ✅ Implemented ephemeral session-key encryption (AES-GCM-256)
- ✅ Auto-clear mnemonic after QR generation (Backup flow)
- ✅ Encrypted cache for sensitive state
- ✅ Manual Lock/Clear functionality
### v1.2.0 (2026-01-27)
- ✅ Added storage monitoring (StorageIndicator)
- ✅ Added security warnings (context-aware)
- ✅ Added clipboard tracking
- ✅ Implemented read-only mode
### v1.1.0 (2026-01-26)
- ✅ Initial public release
- ✅ QR code generation and scanning
- ✅ Full BIP39 mnemonic support
- ✅ Trezor test vector validation
- ✅ Production-ready implementation
## Roadmap
- [ ] UI polish (modern crypto wallet design)
- [ ] Multi-frame support for larger payloads
- [ ] Hardware wallet integration
- [ ] Mobile scanning app
- [ ] Shamir Secret Sharing support
- [ ] Reproducible builds with git hash verification
## License
MIT License - see LICENSE file for details
## Author
**kccleoc** - [GitHub](https://github.com/kccleoc)
--- ---
⚠️ **Disclaimer**: This software is provided as-is. Always test thoroughly before trusting with real funds. The author is not responsible for lost funds due to software bugs or user error. ## 🗺️ Roadmap
### Short-term (v1.5.x)
- [ ] Enhanced BIP39 validation (full wordlist + checksum)
- [ ] Multi-frame support for larger payloads
- [ ] Hardware wallet integration (Trezor/Keystone)
### Medium-term
- [ ] Shamir Secret Sharing support
- [ ] Mobile companion app (React Native)
- [ ] Printable paper backup templates
- [ ] Encrypted cloud backup with PBKDF2
### Long-term
- [ ] BIP85 child mnemonic derivation
- [ ] Quantum-resistant algorithm options
- [ ] Cross-platform desktop app (Tauri)
---
## ⚖️ License
MIT License - see [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for details.
## 👤 Author
**kccleoc** - [GitHub](https://github.com/kccleoc)
**Security Audit**: v1.4.4 audited for vulnerabilities, no exploits found
---
## ⚠️ Important Disclaimer
**CRYPTOGRAPHY IS HARD. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.**
This software is provided as-is, without warranty of any kind. Always:
1. **Test with small amounts** before trusting with significant funds
2. **Verify decryption works** immediately after creating backups
3. **Keep multiple backup copies** in different physical locations
4. **Consider professional advice** for large cryptocurrency holdings
The author is not responsible for lost funds due to software bugs, user error, or security breaches.
---
## 🆘 Getting Help
- **Issues**: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/kccleoc/seedpgp-web/issues)
- **Security Concerns**: Private disclosure via GitHub security advisory
- **Recovery Help**: See [RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md](RECOVERY_PLAYBOOK.md) for offline recovery instructions
**Remember**: Your seed phrase is the key to your cryptocurrency. Guard it with your life.

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
## SeedPGP Recovery Playbook - Offline Recovery Guide ## SeedPGP Recovery Playbook - Offline Recovery Guide
**Generated:** Feb 1, 2026 | **SeedPGP v1.4.3** | **Frame Format:** `SEEDPGP1:0:CRC16:BASE45_PAYLOAD` **Generated:** Feb 3, 2026 | **SeedPGP v1.4.4** | **Frame Format:** `SEEDPGP1:0:CRC16:BASE45_PAYLOAD`
*** ***
@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ print(f"BIP39 Passphrase used: {'YES' if data['pp'] == 1 else 'NO'}")
**Print this playbook on archival paper or metal. Store separately from encrypted backups and private keys.** 🔒 **Print this playbook on archival paper or metal. Store separately from encrypted backups and private keys.** 🔒
**Last Updated:** February 1, 2026 **Last Updated:** February 3, 2026
**SeedPGP Version:** 1.4.3 **SeedPGP Version:** 1.4.4
**Frame Example CRC:** 58B5 ✓ **Frame Example CRC:** 58B5 ✓
**Test Recovery:** [ ] Completed [ ] Not Tested **Test Recovery:** [ ] Completed [ ] Not Tested

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{ {
"name": "seedpgp-web", "name": "seedpgp-web",
"private": true, "private": true,
"version": "1.4.3", "version": "1.4.4",
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"scripts": { "scripts": {
"dev": "vite", "dev": "vite",

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import { PgpKeyInput } from './components/PgpKeyInput';
import { QrDisplay } from './components/QrDisplay'; import { QrDisplay } from './components/QrDisplay';
import QRScanner from './components/QRScanner'; import QRScanner from './components/QRScanner';
import { validateBip39Mnemonic } from './lib/bip39'; import { validateBip39Mnemonic } from './lib/bip39';
import { buildPlaintext, encryptToSeedPgp, decryptSeedPgp } from './lib/seedpgp'; import { buildPlaintext, encryptToSeed, decryptFromSeed, detectEncryptionMode } from './lib/seedpgp';
import * as openpgp from 'openpgp'; import * as openpgp from 'openpgp';
import { SecurityWarnings } from './components/SecurityWarnings'; import { SecurityWarnings } from './components/SecurityWarnings';
import { getSessionKey, encryptJsonToBlob, destroySessionKey, EncryptedBlob } from './lib/sessionCrypto'; import { getSessionKey, encryptJsonToBlob, destroySessionKey, EncryptedBlob } from './lib/sessionCrypto';
@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ function App() {
const [clipboardEvents, setClipboardEvents] = useState<ClipboardEvent[]>([]); const [clipboardEvents, setClipboardEvents] = useState<ClipboardEvent[]>([]);
const [showLockConfirm, setShowLockConfirm] = useState(false); const [showLockConfirm, setShowLockConfirm] = useState(false);
// Krux integration state
const [encryptionMode, setEncryptionMode] = useState<'pgp' | 'krux'>('pgp');
const [kruxLabel, setKruxLabel] = useState('Seed Backup');
const [kruxIterations, setKruxIterations] = useState(200000);
const [detectedMode, setDetectedMode] = useState<'pgp' | 'krux' | null>(null);
const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS = ['key', 'mnemonic', 'seed', 'private', 'secret', 'pgp', 'password']; const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS = ['key', 'mnemonic', 'seed', 'private', 'secret', 'pgp', 'password'];
const isSensitiveKey = (key: string): boolean => { const isSensitiveKey = (key: string): boolean => {
@@ -170,6 +176,20 @@ function App() {
return () => document.removeEventListener('copy', handleCopy as EventListener); return () => document.removeEventListener('copy', handleCopy as EventListener);
}, []); }, []);
// Detect encryption mode from restore input
useEffect(() => {
if (activeTab === 'restore' && restoreInput.trim()) {
const detected = detectEncryptionMode(restoreInput);
setDetectedMode(detected);
// Auto-switch mode if not already set
if (detected !== encryptionMode) {
setEncryptionMode(detected);
}
} else {
setDetectedMode(null);
}
}, [restoreInput, activeTab, encryptionMode]);
const clearClipboard = async () => { const clearClipboard = async () => {
try { try {
// Actually clear the system clipboard // Actually clear the system clipboard
@@ -233,10 +253,13 @@ function App() {
const plaintext = buildPlaintext(mnemonic, hasBip39Passphrase); const plaintext = buildPlaintext(mnemonic, hasBip39Passphrase);
const result = await encryptToSeedPgp({ const result = await encryptToSeed({
plaintext, plaintext,
publicKeyArmored: publicKeyInput || undefined, publicKeyArmored: publicKeyInput || undefined,
messagePassword: backupMessagePassword || undefined, messagePassword: backupMessagePassword || undefined,
mode: encryptionMode,
kruxLabel: encryptionMode === 'krux' ? kruxLabel : undefined,
kruxIterations: encryptionMode === 'krux' ? kruxIterations : undefined,
}); });
setQrPayload(result.framed); setQrPayload(result.framed);
@@ -263,11 +286,15 @@ function App() {
setDecryptedRestoredMnemonic(null); setDecryptedRestoredMnemonic(null);
try { try {
const result = await decryptSeedPgp({ // Auto-detect mode if not manually set
const modeToUse = detectedMode || encryptionMode;
const result = await decryptFromSeed({
frameText: restoreInput, frameText: restoreInput,
privateKeyArmored: privateKeyInput || undefined, privateKeyArmored: privateKeyInput || undefined,
privateKeyPassphrase: privateKeyPassphrase || undefined, privateKeyPassphrase: privateKeyPassphrase || undefined,
messagePassword: restoreMessagePassword || undefined, messagePassword: restoreMessagePassword || undefined,
mode: modeToUse,
}); });
// Encrypt the restored mnemonic with the session key // Encrypt the restored mnemonic with the session key
@@ -460,6 +487,66 @@ function App() {
<div className="p-5 bg-gradient-to-br from-slate-50 to-slate-100 rounded-2xl border-2 border-slate-200 shadow-inner space-y-4"> <div className="p-5 bg-gradient-to-br from-slate-50 to-slate-100 rounded-2xl border-2 border-slate-200 shadow-inner space-y-4">
{/* Removed h3 */} {/* Removed h3 */}
{/* Encryption Mode Toggle */}
<div className="space-y-2">
<label className="text-xs font-bold text-slate-500 uppercase tracking-wider">Encryption Mode</label>
<select
value={encryptionMode}
onChange={(e) => setEncryptionMode(e.target.value as 'pgp' | 'krux')}
disabled={isReadOnly}
className="w-full px-3 py-2.5 bg-white border border-slate-200 rounded-lg text-sm focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-teal-500 transition-all"
>
<option value="pgp">PGP (Asymmetric)</option>
<option value="krux">Krux KEF (Passphrase)</option>
</select>
<p className="text-[10px] text-slate-500 mt-1">
{encryptionMode === 'pgp'
? 'Uses PGP keys or password'
: 'Uses passphrase only (Krux compatible)'}
</p>
</div>
{/* Krux-specific fields */}
{encryptionMode === 'krux' && activeTab === 'backup' && (
<>
<div className="space-y-2 pt-2">
<label className="text-xs font-bold text-slate-500 uppercase tracking-wider">Krux Label</label>
<div className="relative">
<input
type="text"
className={`w-full pl-3 pr-4 py-2.5 bg-white border border-slate-200 rounded-lg text-sm focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-teal-500 transition-all ${
isReadOnly ? 'blur-sm select-none' : ''
}`}
placeholder="e.g., My Seed 2026"
value={kruxLabel}
onChange={(e) => setKruxLabel(e.target.value)}
readOnly={isReadOnly}
/>
</div>
<p className="text-[10px] text-slate-500 mt-1">Label for identification (max 252 bytes)</p>
</div>
<div className="space-y-2">
<label className="text-xs font-bold text-slate-500 uppercase tracking-wider">PBKDF2 Iterations</label>
<div className="relative">
<input
type="number"
className={`w-full pl-3 pr-4 py-2.5 bg-white border border-slate-200 rounded-lg text-sm focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-teal-500 transition-all ${
isReadOnly ? 'blur-sm select-none' : ''
}`}
placeholder="e.g., 200000"
value={kruxIterations}
onChange={(e) => setKruxIterations(Number(e.target.value))}
min={10000}
step={10000}
readOnly={isReadOnly}
/>
</div>
<p className="text-[10px] text-slate-500 mt-1">Higher = more secure but slower (default: 200,000)</p>
</div>
</>
)}
<div className="space-y-2"> <div className="space-y-2">
<label className="text-xs font-bold text-slate-500 uppercase tracking-wider">Message Password</label> <label className="text-xs font-bold text-slate-500 uppercase tracking-wider">Message Password</label>
<div className="relative"> <div className="relative">
@@ -469,13 +556,17 @@ function App() {
className={`w-full pl-10 pr-4 py-2.5 bg-white border border-slate-200 rounded-lg text-sm focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-teal-500 transition-all ${ className={`w-full pl-10 pr-4 py-2.5 bg-white border border-slate-200 rounded-lg text-sm focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-teal-500 transition-all ${
isReadOnly ? 'blur-sm select-none' : '' isReadOnly ? 'blur-sm select-none' : ''
}`} }`}
placeholder="Optional password..." placeholder={encryptionMode === 'krux' ? "Required for Krux encryption" : "Optional password..."}
value={activeTab === 'backup' ? backupMessagePassword : restoreMessagePassword} value={activeTab === 'backup' ? backupMessagePassword : restoreMessagePassword}
onChange={(e) => activeTab === 'backup' ? setBackupMessagePassword(e.target.value) : setRestoreMessagePassword(e.target.value)} onChange={(e) => activeTab === 'backup' ? setBackupMessagePassword(e.target.value) : setRestoreMessagePassword(e.target.value)}
readOnly={isReadOnly} readOnly={isReadOnly}
/> />
</div> </div>
<p className="text-[10px] text-slate-500 mt-1">Symmetric encryption password (SKESK)</p> <p className="text-[10px] text-slate-500 mt-1">
{encryptionMode === 'krux'
? 'Required passphrase for Krux encryption'
: 'Symmetric encryption password (SKESK)'}
</p>
</div> </div>

189
src/lib/krux.test.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
// Krux KEF tests using Bun test runner
import { describe, test, expect } from "bun:test";
import {
encryptToKrux,
decryptFromKrux,
hexToBytes,
bytesToHex,
wrap,
unwrap,
KruxCipher
} from './krux';
describe('Krux KEF Implementation', () => {
// Test basic hex conversion
test('hexToBytes and bytesToHex roundtrip', () => {
const original = 'Hello, World!';
const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(original);
const hex = bytesToHex(bytes);
const back = hexToBytes(hex);
expect(new TextDecoder().decode(back)).toBe(original);
});
test('hexToBytes handles KEF: prefix', () => {
const hex = '48656C6C6F';
const withPrefix = `KEF:${hex}`;
const bytes1 = hexToBytes(hex);
const bytes2 = hexToBytes(withPrefix);
expect(bytes2).toEqual(bytes1);
});
test('hexToBytes rejects invalid hex', () => {
expect(() => hexToBytes('12345')).toThrow('Hex string must have even length');
expect(() => hexToBytes('12345G')).toThrow('Invalid hex string');
});
// Test wrap/unwrap
test('wrap and unwrap roundtrip', () => {
const label = 'Test Label';
const version = 20;
const iterations = 200000;
const payload = new TextEncoder().encode('test payload');
const wrapped = wrap(label, version, iterations, payload);
const unwrapped = unwrap(wrapped);
expect(unwrapped.label).toBe(label);
expect(unwrapped.version).toBe(version);
expect(unwrapped.iterations).toBe(iterations);
expect(unwrapped.payload).toEqual(payload);
});
test('wrap rejects label too long', () => {
const longLabel = 'a'.repeat(253); // 253 > 252 max
const payload = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
expect(() => wrap(longLabel, 20, 10000, payload))
.toThrow('Label too long');
});
test('wrap accepts empty label', () => {
const payload = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
const wrapped = wrap('', 20, 10000, payload);
const unwrapped = unwrap(wrapped);
expect(unwrapped.label).toBe('');
expect(unwrapped.version).toBe(20);
expect(unwrapped.iterations).toBe(10000);
expect(unwrapped.payload).toEqual(payload);
});
test('unwrap rejects invalid envelope', () => {
expect(() => unwrap(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]))).toThrow('Invalid KEF envelope: too short');
// Label length too large (253 > 252)
expect(() => unwrap(new Uint8Array([253, 20, 0, 0, 100]))).toThrow('Invalid label length');
// Empty label (lenId=0) is valid, but need enough data for version+iterations
// Create a valid envelope with empty label: [0, version, iter1, iter2, iter3, payload...]
const emptyLabelEnvelope = new Uint8Array([0, 20, 0, 0, 100, 1, 2, 3]);
const unwrapped = unwrap(emptyLabelEnvelope);
expect(unwrapped.label).toBe('');
expect(unwrapped.version).toBe(20);
});
// Test encryption/decryption
test('encryptToKrux and decryptFromKrux roundtrip', async () => {
const mnemonic = 'test test test test test test test test test test test junk';
const passphrase = 'secure-passphrase';
const label = 'Test Seed';
const iterations = 10000;
const encrypted = await encryptToKrux({
mnemonic,
passphrase,
label,
iterations,
version: 20,
});
expect(encrypted.kefHex).toMatch(/^[0-9A-F]+$/);
expect(encrypted.label).toBe(label);
expect(encrypted.iterations).toBe(iterations);
expect(encrypted.version).toBe(20);
const decrypted = await decryptFromKrux({
kefHex: encrypted.kefHex,
passphrase,
});
expect(decrypted.mnemonic).toBe(mnemonic);
expect(decrypted.label).toBe(label);
expect(decrypted.iterations).toBe(iterations);
expect(decrypted.version).toBe(20);
});
test('encryptToKrux requires passphrase', async () => {
await expect(encryptToKrux({
mnemonic: 'test',
passphrase: '',
})).rejects.toThrow('Passphrase is required');
});
test('decryptFromKrux requires passphrase', async () => {
await expect(decryptFromKrux({
kefHex: '123456',
passphrase: '',
})).rejects.toThrow('Passphrase is required');
});
test('wrong passphrase fails decryption', async () => {
const mnemonic = 'test mnemonic';
const passphrase = 'correct-passphrase';
const encrypted = await encryptToKrux({
mnemonic,
passphrase,
});
await expect(decryptFromKrux({
kefHex: encrypted.kefHex,
passphrase: 'wrong-passphrase',
})).rejects.toThrow(/Krux decryption failed/);
});
// Test KruxCipher class directly
test('KruxCipher encrypt/decrypt roundtrip', async () => {
const cipher = new KruxCipher('passphrase', 'salt', 10000);
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('secret message');
const encrypted = await cipher.encrypt(plaintext);
const decrypted = await cipher.decrypt(encrypted, 20);
expect(new TextDecoder().decode(decrypted)).toBe('secret message');
});
test('KruxCipher rejects unsupported version', async () => {
const cipher = new KruxCipher('passphrase', 'salt', 10000);
const plaintext = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
await expect(cipher.encrypt(plaintext, 99)).rejects.toThrow('Unsupported KEF version');
await expect(cipher.decrypt(new Uint8Array(50), 99)).rejects.toThrow('Unsupported KEF version');
});
test('KruxCipher rejects short payload', async () => {
const cipher = new KruxCipher('passphrase', 'salt', 10000);
// Version 20: IV (12) + auth (4) = 16 bytes minimum
const shortPayload = new Uint8Array(15); // Too short for IV + GCM tag (needs at least 16)
await expect(cipher.decrypt(shortPayload, 20)).rejects.toThrow('Payload too short for AES-GCM');
});
test('iterations scaling works correctly', () => {
// Test that iterations are scaled properly when divisible by 10000
const label = 'Test';
const version = 20;
const payload = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
// 200000 should be scaled to 20 in the envelope
const wrapped1 = wrap(label, version, 200000, payload);
expect(wrapped1[6]).toBe(0); // 200000 / 10000 = 20
expect(wrapped1[7]).toBe(0);
expect(wrapped1[8]).toBe(20);
// 10001 should not be scaled
const wrapped2 = wrap(label, version, 10001, payload);
const iterStart = 2 + label.length;
const iters = (wrapped2[iterStart] << 16) | (wrapped2[iterStart + 1] << 8) | wrapped2[iterStart + 2];
expect(iters).toBe(10001);
});
});

331
src/lib/krux.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
// src/lib/krux.ts
// Krux KEF (Krux Encryption Format) implementation
// Compatible with Krux firmware (AES-GCM, label as salt, hex QR)
// Currently implements version 20 (AES-GCM without compression)
// Version 21 (AES-GCM +c) support can be added later with compression
// KEF version definitions (matches Python reference)
export const VERSIONS: Record<number, {
name: string;
compress?: boolean;
auth: number; // GCM tag length (4 for version 20, full 16 for v1?)
}> = {
20: { name: "AES-GCM", auth: 4 },
// Version 21 would be: { name: "AES-GCM +c", compress: true, auth: 4 }
};
// IV length for GCM mode
const GCM_IV_LENGTH = 12;
/**
* Convert data to a proper ArrayBuffer for Web Crypto API.
* Ensures it's not a SharedArrayBuffer.
*/
function toArrayBuffer(data: Uint8Array): ArrayBuffer {
// Always create a new ArrayBuffer and copy the data
const buffer = new ArrayBuffer(data.length);
new Uint8Array(buffer).set(data);
return buffer;
}
/**
* Wrap data into KEF envelope format (matches Python exactly)
* Format: [1 byte label length][label bytes][1 byte version][3 bytes iterations][payload]
*/
export function wrap(label: string, version: number, iterations: number, payload: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
const labelBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(label);
if (!(0 <= labelBytes.length && labelBytes.length <= 252)) {
throw new Error("Label too long (max 252 bytes)");
}
const lenId = new Uint8Array([labelBytes.length]);
const versionByte = new Uint8Array([version]);
let itersBytes = new Uint8Array(3);
// Krux firmware expects iterations in multiples of 10000 when possible
if (iterations % 10000 === 0) {
const scaled = iterations / 10000;
if (!(1 <= scaled && scaled <= 10000)) {
throw new Error("Iterations out of scaled range");
}
itersBytes[0] = (scaled >> 16) & 0xff;
itersBytes[1] = (scaled >> 8) & 0xff;
itersBytes[2] = scaled & 0xff;
} else {
if (!(10000 < iterations && iterations < 2**24)) {
throw new Error("Iterations out of range");
}
itersBytes[0] = (iterations >> 16) & 0xff;
itersBytes[1] = (iterations >> 8) & 0xff;
itersBytes[2] = iterations & 0xff;
}
return new Uint8Array([...lenId, ...labelBytes, ...versionByte, ...itersBytes, ...payload]);
}
/**
* Unwrap KEF envelope to extract components (matches Python exactly)
*/
export function unwrap(envelope: Uint8Array): {
label: string;
version: number;
iterations: number;
payload: Uint8Array
} {
if (envelope.length < 5) {
throw new Error("Invalid KEF envelope: too short");
}
const lenId = envelope[0];
if (!(0 <= lenId && lenId <= 252)) {
throw new Error("Invalid label length in KEF envelope");
}
if (1 + lenId + 4 > envelope.length) {
throw new Error("Invalid KEF envelope: insufficient data");
}
const labelBytes = envelope.subarray(1, 1 + lenId);
const label = new TextDecoder().decode(labelBytes);
const version = envelope[1 + lenId];
const iterStart = 2 + lenId;
let iters = (envelope[iterStart] << 16) | (envelope[iterStart + 1] << 8) | envelope[iterStart + 2];
const iterations = iters <= 10000 ? iters * 10000 : iters;
const payload = envelope.subarray(5 + lenId);
return { label, version, iterations, payload };
}
/**
* Krux Cipher class for AES-GCM encryption/decryption
*/
export class KruxCipher {
private keyPromise: Promise<CryptoKey>;
constructor(passphrase: string, salt: string, iterations: number) {
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
this.keyPromise = (async () => {
// Import passphrase as raw key material
const passphraseBytes = encoder.encode(passphrase);
const passphraseBuffer = toArrayBuffer(passphraseBytes);
const baseKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
"raw",
passphraseBuffer,
{ name: "PBKDF2" },
false,
["deriveKey"]
);
// Derive AES-GCM key using PBKDF2
const saltBytes = encoder.encode(salt);
const saltBuffer = toArrayBuffer(saltBytes);
return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
{
name: "PBKDF2",
salt: saltBuffer,
iterations: Math.max(1, iterations),
hash: "SHA-256"
},
baseKey,
{ name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 },
false,
["encrypt", "decrypt"]
);
})();
}
/**
* Encrypt plaintext using AES-GCM
*/
async encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array, version = 20, iv?: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {
const v = VERSIONS[version];
if (!v) {
throw new Error(`Unsupported KEF version: ${version}`);
}
// Note: No compression for version 20
// For version 21, we would add compression here
// Ensure ivBytes is a fresh Uint8Array with its own ArrayBuffer (not SharedArrayBuffer)
let ivBytes: Uint8Array;
if (iv) {
// Copy the iv to ensure we have our own buffer
ivBytes = new Uint8Array(iv.length);
ivBytes.set(iv);
} else {
// Create new random IV with a proper ArrayBuffer
ivBytes = new Uint8Array(GCM_IV_LENGTH);
crypto.getRandomValues(ivBytes);
}
const key = await this.keyPromise;
const plaintextBuffer = toArrayBuffer(plaintext);
const ivBuffer = toArrayBuffer(ivBytes);
// Use auth length from version definition (in bytes, convert to bits)
const tagLengthBits = v.auth * 8;
const encrypted = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{
name: "AES-GCM",
iv: ivBuffer,
tagLength: tagLengthBits
},
key,
plaintextBuffer
);
// For GCM, encrypted result includes ciphertext + tag
// Separate ciphertext and tag
const authBytes = v.auth;
const encryptedBytes = new Uint8Array(encrypted);
const ciphertext = encryptedBytes.slice(0, encryptedBytes.length - authBytes);
const tag = encryptedBytes.slice(encryptedBytes.length - authBytes);
// Combine IV + ciphertext + tag (matches Python format)
const combined = new Uint8Array(ivBytes.length + ciphertext.length + tag.length);
combined.set(ivBytes, 0);
combined.set(ciphertext, ivBytes.length);
combined.set(tag, ivBytes.length + ciphertext.length);
return combined;
}
/**
* Decrypt payload using AES-GCM
*/
async decrypt(payload: Uint8Array, version: number): Promise<Uint8Array> {
const v = VERSIONS[version];
if (!v) {
throw new Error(`Unsupported KEF version: ${version}`);
}
const ivLen = GCM_IV_LENGTH;
const authBytes = v.auth;
// Payload is IV + ciphertext + tag
if (payload.length < ivLen + authBytes) {
throw new Error("Payload too short for AES-GCM");
}
// Extract IV, ciphertext, and tag
const iv = payload.slice(0, ivLen);
const ciphertext = payload.slice(ivLen, payload.length - authBytes);
const tag = payload.slice(payload.length - authBytes);
const key = await this.keyPromise;
try {
// For Web Crypto, we need to combine ciphertext + tag
const ciphertextWithTag = new Uint8Array(ciphertext.length + tag.length);
ciphertextWithTag.set(ciphertext, 0);
ciphertextWithTag.set(tag, ciphertext.length);
const ciphertextBuffer = toArrayBuffer(ciphertextWithTag);
const ivBuffer = toArrayBuffer(iv);
const decrypted = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
{
name: "AES-GCM",
iv: ivBuffer,
tagLength: authBytes * 8
},
key,
ciphertextBuffer
);
return new Uint8Array(decrypted);
} catch (error) {
// Web Crypto throws generic errors for decryption failure
// Convert to user-friendly message
throw new Error("Krux decryption failed - wrong passphrase or corrupted data");
}
}
}
/**
* Convert hex string to bytes
*/
export function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {
// Remove any whitespace and optional KEF: prefix
const cleaned = hex.trim().replace(/\s/g, '').replace(/^KEF:/i, '');
if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(cleaned)) {
throw new Error("Invalid hex string");
}
if (cleaned.length % 2 !== 0) {
throw new Error("Hex string must have even length");
}
const bytes = new Uint8Array(cleaned.length / 2);
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
bytes[i] = parseInt(cleaned.substr(i * 2, 2), 16);
}
return bytes;
}
/**
* Convert bytes to hex string
*/
export function bytesToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
return Array.from(bytes)
.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))
.join('')
.toUpperCase();
}
/**
* Encrypt mnemonic to KEF format
*/
export async function encryptToKrux(params: {
mnemonic: string;
passphrase: string;
label?: string;
iterations?: number;
version?: number;
}): Promise<{ kefHex: string; label: string; version: number; iterations: number }> {
const label = params.label || "Seed Backup";
const iterations = params.iterations || 200000;
const version = params.version || 20;
if (!params.passphrase) {
throw new Error("Passphrase is required for Krux encryption");
}
const mnemonicBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(params.mnemonic);
const cipher = new KruxCipher(params.passphrase, label, iterations);
const payload = await cipher.encrypt(mnemonicBytes, version);
const kef = wrap(label, version, iterations, payload);
return {
kefHex: bytesToHex(kef),
label,
version,
iterations
};
}
/**
* Decrypt KEF hex to mnemonic
*/
export async function decryptFromKrux(params: {
kefHex: string;
passphrase: string;
}): Promise<{ mnemonic: string; label: string; version: number; iterations: number }> {
if (!params.passphrase) {
throw new Error("Passphrase is required for Krux decryption");
}
const bytes = hexToBytes(params.kefHex);
const { label, version, iterations, payload } = unwrap(bytes);
const cipher = new KruxCipher(params.passphrase, label, iterations);
const decrypted = await cipher.decrypt(payload, version);
const mnemonic = new TextDecoder().decode(decrypted);
return { mnemonic, label, version, iterations };
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,15 @@
import * as openpgp from "openpgp"; import * as openpgp from "openpgp";
import { base45Encode, base45Decode } from "./base45"; import { base45Encode, base45Decode } from "./base45";
import { crc16CcittFalse } from "./crc16"; import { crc16CcittFalse } from "./crc16";
import type { SeedPgpPlaintext, ParsedSeedPgpFrame } from "./types"; import { encryptToKrux, decryptFromKrux, hexToBytes } from "./krux";
import type {
SeedPgpPlaintext,
ParsedSeedPgpFrame,
EncryptionMode,
EncryptionParams,
DecryptionParams,
EncryptionResult
} from "./types";
// Configure OpenPGP.js (disable warnings) // Configure OpenPGP.js (disable warnings)
openpgp.config.showComment = false; openpgp.config.showComment = false;
@@ -194,3 +202,135 @@ export async function decryptSeedPgp(params: {
return obj; return obj;
} }
/**
* Unified encryption function supporting both PGP and Krux modes
*/
export async function encryptToSeed(params: EncryptionParams): Promise<EncryptionResult> {
const mode = params.mode || 'pgp';
if (mode === 'krux') {
const plaintextStr = typeof params.plaintext === 'string'
? params.plaintext
: params.plaintext.w;
const passphrase = params.messagePassword || '';
if (!passphrase) {
throw new Error("Krux mode requires a message password (passphrase)");
}
try {
const result = await encryptToKrux({
mnemonic: plaintextStr,
passphrase,
label: params.kruxLabel,
iterations: params.kruxIterations,
version: params.kruxVersion,
});
return {
framed: result.kefHex,
label: result.label,
version: result.version,
iterations: result.iterations,
};
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
throw new Error(`Krux encryption failed: ${error.message}`);
}
throw error;
}
}
// Default to PGP mode
const plaintextObj = typeof params.plaintext === 'string'
? buildPlaintext(params.plaintext, false)
: params.plaintext;
const result = await encryptToSeedPgp({
plaintext: plaintextObj,
publicKeyArmored: params.publicKeyArmored,
messagePassword: params.messagePassword,
});
return {
framed: result.framed,
pgpBytes: result.pgpBytes,
recipientFingerprint: result.recipientFingerprint,
};
}
/**
* Unified decryption function supporting both PGP and Krux modes
*/
export async function decryptFromSeed(params: DecryptionParams): Promise<SeedPgpPlaintext> {
const mode = params.mode || 'pgp';
if (mode === 'krux') {
const passphrase = params.messagePassword || '';
if (!passphrase) {
throw new Error("Krux mode requires a message password (passphrase)");
}
try {
const result = await decryptFromKrux({
kefHex: params.frameText,
passphrase,
});
// Convert to SeedPgpPlaintext format for consistency
return {
v: 1,
t: "bip39",
w: result.mnemonic,
l: "en",
pp: 0,
};
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
throw new Error(`Krux decryption failed: ${error.message}`);
}
throw error;
}
}
// Default to PGP mode
return decryptSeedPgp({
frameText: params.frameText,
privateKeyArmored: params.privateKeyArmored,
privateKeyPassphrase: params.privateKeyPassphrase,
messagePassword: params.messagePassword,
});
}
/**
* Detect encryption mode from input text
*/
export function detectEncryptionMode(text: string): EncryptionMode {
const trimmed = text.trim();
// Check for SEEDPGP1 format
if (trimmed.startsWith('SEEDPGP1:')) {
return 'pgp';
}
// Check for hex format (Krux KEF)
const cleaned = trimmed.replace(/\s/g, '').replace(/^KEF:/i, '');
if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(cleaned) && cleaned.length % 2 === 0) {
// Try to parse as KEF to confirm
try {
const bytes = hexToBytes(cleaned);
if (bytes.length >= 5) {
const lenId = bytes[0];
if (lenId > 0 && lenId <= 252 && 1 + lenId + 4 <= bytes.length) {
return 'krux';
}
}
} catch {
// Not valid KEF, fall through
}
}
// Default to PGP for backward compatibility
return 'pgp';
}

View File

@@ -12,3 +12,39 @@ export type ParsedSeedPgpFrame = {
crc16: string; crc16: string;
b45: string; b45: string;
}; };
// Krux KEF types
export type KruxEncryptionParams = {
label?: string;
iterations?: number;
version?: number;
};
export type EncryptionMode = 'pgp' | 'krux';
export type EncryptionParams = {
plaintext: SeedPgpPlaintext | string;
publicKeyArmored?: string;
messagePassword?: string;
mode?: EncryptionMode;
kruxLabel?: string;
kruxIterations?: number;
kruxVersion?: number;
};
export type DecryptionParams = {
frameText: string;
privateKeyArmored?: string;
privateKeyPassphrase?: string;
messagePassword?: string;
mode?: EncryptionMode;
};
export type EncryptionResult = {
framed: string;
pgpBytes?: Uint8Array;
recipientFingerprint?: string;
label?: string;
version?: number;
iterations?: number;
};